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Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” 
(Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist ap-
proaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to 
anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note re-
sponds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception 
face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of 
how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-decep-
tion, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
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I originally proposed the selectivity problem in Bermúdez 1997, 1999, 
and 2000 as an argument for intentionalist, as opposed to anti-inten-
tionalist or defl ationary, approaches to self-deception. Intentionalists 
claim that intrapersonal self-deception effectively mirrors interperson-
al deception. In both cases the (self-) deceiver intentionally brings it 
about that the (self-)deceived person acquires a belief, or other propo-
sitional attitude. Just as the interpersonal deceiver intends to bring it 
about that his victim acquires a particular belief, so to does the intra-
personal self-deceiver intend to bring it about that he himself acquire 
a particular belief.
In opposition to intentionalism, anti-intentionalists such as Al Mele 
argue that self-deceiving belief acquisition can be explained solely in 
terms of motivational bias and similar mechanisms, without assuming 
any intention to acquire a belief (Mele 1997, 2001, 2012). In his 1997 
account, for example, Mele proposes the following four jointly suffi cient 
conditions for S to acquire a belief through self-deception.
1) The belief that p acquires is false
2) S treats data seemingly relevant to the truth of p in a motiva-
tionally biased way.
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3) This biased treatment non-deviantly causes S to come to believe 
that p
4) The evidence that S possesses provides greater warrant for ~p 
than for p.
The selectivity problem is directed in particular at components (2) and 
(3) of this account. My objection is that the anti-intentionalist does not 
have the resources to explain why motivational bias should be brought 
to bear in some cases and not in others:
Self-deception is paradigmatically selective. Any explanation of a given in-
stance of self-deception will need to explain why motivational bias occurred 
in that particular situation. But the desire that p should be the case is in-
suffi cient to motivate cognitive bias in favor of the belief that p. There are 
all sorts of situations in which, however strongly we desire it to be the case 
that p, we are not in any way biased in favor of the belief that p. How are 
we to distinguish those from situations in which our desires result in moti-
vational bias? I will call this the selectivity problem (Bermúdez 2000: 317)
Only intentionalist models of self-deception can solve the selectivity 
problem, I claim. In order for a self-deceiver to come to believe that 
p there must be not simply a desire that p be the case, coupled with 
various biased mechanisms of belief formation, but also an intention 
to believe that p.
Jurjako raises the very interesting objection that intentionalist 
models face their own version of the selectivity problem. He starts with 
the plausible assumption that intentions are formed for reasons, typi-
cally beliefs and desires.
So, in order to explain why in this particular instance self-deception oc-
curred, we need to invoke a desire and a belief. But now we can ask why in 
this particular situation a desire that p be the case caused an intention to 
believe that p is the case? As Bermúdez noted, we have all kinds of desires 
that, nevertheless how strong, do not cause us to believe that p is the case; 
similarly we can say that we have different strong desires to believe that p 
be the case (or that we believe that p is the case), that nevertheless do not 
cause an intention to believe that p. So in this way we can raise the selec-
tivity problem against the intentionalist account. Namely, we can raise the 
question why in this particular situation the desire that p be the case (or 
to believe that p) caused an intention to believe that p is the case since, ac-
cording to Bermúdez, in all kinds of situations, no matter how strongly we 
desire that p be the case it does not cause us to believe that p is the case. 
(Jurjako 2013: 155)
Jurjako proposes two options that an intentionalist can take to resolve 
this new version of the selectivity problem. The fi rst option is to as-
sume that self-deceptive intentions emerge “by sheer chance” from the 
reasons that precede the intention.1 The second option is to suppose 
1 Actually, Jurjako refers to “intentions to self-deceive”, but intentionalists about 
self-deception are certainly not committed to holding that a self-deceptive intention 
is always an intention to deceive oneself. I can (self-deceptively) intend to bring it 
about that I believe that p without intending to deceive myself. For further analysis 
of how to understand self-deceptive intentions see Bermúdez 2000.
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that self-deceptive intentions result from a conscious decision. Accord-
ing to Jurjako, intentionalists are caught on the horns of a dilemma 
here. The fi rst option is highly implausible and in any case does not 
provide a satisfying answer to the selectivity problem. The second op-
tion, on the other hand, does resolve the selectivity problem, but over-
intellectualizes what is going on in self-deception in a way that makes 
it inapplicable to common or garden varieties of self-deception.
I completely agree with Jurjako that the fi rst option is a non-starter 
and will say no more about it. I also agree with him that intentions are 
not determined by standing beliefs and desires. Intentionalist models 
of self-deception could not possibly work unless forming an intention is 
in some sense an autonomous mental act. In that respect intentionalist 
models are committed to something like the commonsense view of the 
progress from thought to action sketched out by David Wiggins at the 
beginning of his paper “Weakness of will, commensurability, and the 
objects of desire” (Wiggins 1978). According to this commonsense view, 
“we need autonomous and mutually irreducible notions of believing, 
desiring, deciding that, deciding to, intending” (Wiggins 1978/9: 244). A 
similar view of the autonomy of intention is defended in Holton 2009.
Both Holton and Wiggins primarily analyze intentions that result 
from choice, where choice typically results from a process of delibera-
tive practical reasoning. Again, I agree with Jurjako that it is not help-
ful to see typical examples of common or garden self-deception as the 
result of deliberative practical reasoning. But we can escape from the 
dilemma that he poses for intentionalist approaches to self-deception 
by recognizing other ways of thinking about how intentions are formed. 
Deliberative and refl ective choice is one end of a spectrum, rather than 
the only game in town.
As standardly understood, intentions lead straight to action (modu-
lo weakness of will), which is why they bridge the gap between beliefs, 
desires, and other propositional attitudes, on the one hand, and action 
on the other. But of course this immediately raises the question of how 
the gap is bridged between propositional attitudes and intentions. The 
canonical model, going at least as far back as the Aristotelian practi-
cal syllogism, sees intentions as resulting from means-end reasoning 
about how best to satisfy desires (taking “desire” broadly enough to 
include what Aristotle would have called the apparent good). But there 
are some important passages where Aristotle appears to recognize 
that even as an idealization the deliberative model often fails to ap-
ply. Looking at those passages points towards an alternative that helps 
make better sense of self-deception.
In an illuminating passage in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics 
Aristotle discusses the distinctive character of practical wisdom (ph-
ronesis) and what distinguishes it from intelligence (nous). He writes:
That practical wisdom is not knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, 
concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of 
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this nature. It is opposed, then, to comprehension; for comprehension is of 
the defi nitions, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is 
concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge 
but of perception—not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but 
a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular fi gure 
before us is a triangle.2
The key idea here is that practical wisdom involves perception. How 
one acts is, in the last analysis, a function of how one sees things.
One way of understanding what is going on here emerges when we 
recall the basic form of the Aristotelian practical syllogism, which con-
tains both a major premise and a minor premise. The major premise is 
typically portrayed in a way that aligns it with belief. In De Motu Ani-
malium Aristotle gives the example: All men ought to walk. The minor 
premise, though, typically comes across differently. The minor premise 
is how a general belief is seen to be applicable to this particular situ-
ation. Here is another important passage from De Anima. Aristotle is 
considering the question (rather strange to modern ears) of whether 
the faculty of knowing moves or is at rest.
The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest. Since the one 
premise or judgment is universal and the other deals with the particular 
(for the fi rst tells us that such and such a kind of man should do such and 
such a kind of act, and the second that this is an act of the kind meant, and 
I a person of the type intended), it is the latter opinion that really originates 
movement, not the universal; or rather it is both, but the one does so while 
it remains in a state more like rest, while the other partakes in movement.3
The minor premise (dealing with the particular) is, to use the earlier 
phrase, what bridges the gap between beliefs, desires, and action. It is 
what allows me to see that the situation I am in is one to which this 
general belief or this desire is applicable.
Without getting into the question of how to reconcile Aristotle’s 
various comments about action, choice, and deliberation,4 it seems to 
me that there is an important insight in these two passages, pointing 
towards an alternative way of thinking about how intentions emerge. 
An intention to act in a certain way can come about because of how I 
interpret or understand the situation in which I fi nd myself. To use a 
very non-Aristotelian term, intentions can result from framing a situ-
ation in a certain way. There are many different types of frame. Some 
are highly intellectualized. But many are not.  Framing a situation can 
be as simple a matter as identifying which other situation it is most 
similar to, highlighting one feature over another, or fi nding an affective 
2 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics Bk. VI 1142a23–1142a28, translated by W. D. 
Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson (in J. Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1) 
3 Aristotle, De Anima Bk. III 433b17–433b21, translated by J. A. Smith (in J. 
Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1).
4 For helpful discussion and further references see Price 2008.
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valence. Framing (and re-framing) a situation in a different way can 
often open up new possibilities for action.5
This way of thinking about intention and choice offers a way out 
of the dilemma Jurjako poses. The intentions that drive common or 
garden self-deception do not have to be viewed as emerging either ran-
domly or from conscious acts of deliberative choice. Instead we can see 
them as emerging from how the self-deceiver frames the situation in 
which they fi nd themselves.  Of course, what is being framed in self-
deception is not, as it were, the object of the self-deceiving belief. The 
spouse determinedly convinced of his spouse’s fi delity despite all the 
evidence to the contrary may well be framing his spouse’s behavior 
in all sorts of ways, but that is not what generates the self-deception 
(more likely, it is explained by the self-deception). What matters for 
self-deception is how the self-deceiver frames the situation in which he 
believes that his spouse is faithful. He might, for example, frame this 
as an act of trust and loyalty. Having a certain belief is part of the per-
son that he wants to be, and it is because he sees things that way that 
he intentionally comes to form the self-deceptive belief. Here it seems 
correct to say both that the intention to form a certain belief is what 
ultimately explains his self-deception, and that the intention does not 
emerge from an over-intellectualized process of conscious choice.
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